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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
It is well-established that people under time pressure make de-
cisions that are of inferior quality. But are there situations in which 
time pressure might improve decision quality? Prior research has 
suggested that stress – at least in moderation and in particular con-
texts – can be beneficial for decision-making. Moderate levels of 
arousal can improve performance in a variety of domains, as sug-
gested by the Yerkes-Dodson law (Andrews and Farris 1972; Deffen-
bacher 1994; Yerkes and Dodson 1908). Similarly, contexts in which 
effortful information processing is attenuated or non-existent, such 
as unconscious thought, can produce accurate and rational decisions 
(Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 2006).
Drawing on three elements in prospect theory (reference depen-
dence, loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity; Camerer 2000; Kahne-
man and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991), we posit that 
loss aversion attenuates under time pressure – that is, people under 
time pressure no longer consider the hedonic impact of losses to be 
greater than that of gains, but roughly to be more equal, relative to 
those under no such constraints. This is because people consider time 
to be a resource, and the loss of time under time pressure is a loss 
of resource, placing them on the locally-convex portion of the value 
function. From this point, the hedonic impact of any further loss di-
minishes, relative to decisions from the status quo. In other words, 
loss aversion attenuates. 
This proposition thus relies on the critical assumption that peo-
ple consider time to be a resource. Thankfully, for our purposes, this 
assumption is well-supported – at least for Western cultures. That 
time is a resource that people can “lose” is consistent with the Prot-
estant ethic that “time is money”. Some people may see time as a 
holder of endless possibilities and opportunities, but most others see 
time as something that they can not slow down, stop, or turn back. 
Time thus is a resource that people must structure, with a lack of 
structure meaning a loss of a valued resource with high opportunity 
costs (Bockstael, Strand, and Hannemann 1987; Casey, Vukina, and 
Danielson 1995; Cesario 1976; Larson 1993; Shaw 1992).
In Experiment 1, we find that the endowment affect – a typical 
demonstration of loss aversion – attenuates under time pressure. That 
is, although sellers typically place a higher valuation on a transaction 
item than buyers, we find that this disparity in valuation disappears 
under time pressure. Mediation analyses suggest that this is because 
sellers under time pressure place less of an emphasis on the positive 
aspects of the transaction item under time pressure. In Experiment 2, 
we find that people under time pressure are less risk-averse to gam-
bles involving both a chance of winning and losing, relative to those 
under no such constraints.
Meanwhile, that loss a version attenuates under time pressure 
assumes that people integrate the loss of time under time pressure 
with any subsequent loss. According to the hedonic editing rules and 
mental accounting (Thaler 1999; Thaler and Johnson 1990), people 
do not integrate losses when the losses occur on different days. Ex-
periment 3 demonstrates that loss aversion attenuates under time 
pressure – but only when the loss of time under time pressure and the 
subsequent loss occurs on the same day.
In Experiment 4, we draw on the fact that people in Western 
cultures are more likely to be monochronic in that they see time as 
a resource that must be structured, relative to those in non-Western 
cultures that are more likely to be polychronic  in that they see time 
as continuous that does not require structure. Thus, if loss aversion 
attenuates under time pressure because people loss time as a resource 
under time pressure, this effect should be stronger for monochronic 
people than polychronic ones. Experiment 5 uses the Time Struc-
ture Questionnaire (Bond and Feather 1988) to show support for 
these propositions. We also note that both Experiments 3 and 4 dem-
onstrate that loss aversion attenuates under time pressure because 
people perceive the hedonic impact of losses to be less under time 
pressure than under no such constraints, with no influence of time 
pressure on the hedonic impact of gains.
The four experiments provide support for our proposition that 
loss aversion attenuates under time pressure. This provides an in-
triguing implication that is counter-intuitive to everyday assumptions 
about the influence of time pressure. But using a value function-
based explanation, we show that our effect is actually consistent with 
the tenets of prospect theory. We note that prior research has sug-
gested that stress – at least in moderation and in particular contexts 
– can be beneficial for decision-making. Moderate levels of arousal 
can improve performance in a variety of domains, as suggested by 
the Yerkes-Dodson law (Andrews and Farris 1972; Deffenbacher 
1994; Yerkes and Dodson 1908). Similarly, contexts in which ef-
fortful information processing is attenuated or non-existent, such as 
unconscious thought, can produce accurate and rational decisions 
(Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 2006). A cognitive load can also increase 
normative behaviours by disrupting the pursuit of biased self-rel-
evant goals (Drolet and Luce 2004) or by reducing uncertainty to 
engender rationality (Goldsmith and Amir 2012). Thus, to the extent 
that time pressure is a form of stress, these findings suggest that it 
may improve decision quality at least in certain instances.
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